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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DECLINE OF THE CONTRACT FOR DEED
IN OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute' which pro-
vides for the most sweeping and decisive statutory regulation of the
contract for deed2 in this country.3 In one paragraph the statute man-
dates that the contract for deed is to be treated as a mortgage whenever
it is used for the purpose of financing the sale of real property and for
securing the immediate right to possession.4 In this instance the con-
tract for deed is "subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the
same regulations, restraints and forms as are prescribed in relation to
mortgages."5
When legislation is passed, courts are faced with the question of its
applicability to particular situations.6 A fundamental rule of statutory
interpretation requires the courts to follow the intent of the legislature,
1. Act of April 26, 1976, ch. 70, 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws 85 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 16,
§ 1 IA (Supp. 1978)). The full text of the act reads:
All contracts for deed for purchase and sale of real property made for the purpose or
with the intention of receiving the payment of money and made for the purpose of estab-
lishing an immediate and continuing right of possession of the described real property,
whether such instruments be from the debtor to the creditor or from the debtor to some
third person in trust for the creditor, shall to that extent be deemed and held mortgages,
and shall be subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations re-
straints, and forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages. No foreclosure shall be
initiated, nor shall the court allow such proceedings, unless the documents have been
filed of record in the county clerk's office, and mortgage tax paid thereon, in the amount
required for regular mortgage transactions.
2. The contract for deed is an executory agreement between the vendor and vendee by
which the former is required to convey real estate at a future date upon the performance of certain
acts or payments by the latter. See, e.g., Blakely v. McCrory, 274 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 1954);
Parks v. Classen Co., 174 Okla. 237, 237, 49 P.2d 1101, 1105 (1935) (syllabus by the court); Stanley
v. Velma A. Barnes Real Estate, Inc., 571 P.2d 871, 873 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). See notes 13-20
infra and accompanying text. The contract for deed is also referred to by such terms as "install-
ment land contract," "long term land sale contract," "conditional sales contract," and "agreement
for deed."
3. Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977
B.Y.U.L. REv. 541, 546. This is an excellent treatment of the subject of contracts for deed on a
national scale.
4. OKLa. STAT. tit. 16, § I IA (Supp. 1978).
5. Id. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, §§ 1-204 (1971 & Supp. 1978) (mortgages).
6. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05, at 15 (4th rev. ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as 2A SUTHERLAND].
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without further inquiry, whenever that intent is "plainly expressed in a
statute. ' 7 Only those statutes which are ambiguous or susceptible of
several meanings are subject to the process of statutory interpretation."
A statute is ambiguous if reasonably well-informed persons tend to at-
tribute different meanings to it.9
A cursory reading of section 1 A might lead to the conclusion that
the statutory language clearly indicates a legislative intent to abrogate
completely the Oklahoma common law concept of contract for deed.10
With additional scrutiny, however, a plausible alternative and nar-
rower interpretation can be gleaned from the statute. This alternative
position suggests that the legislative purpose was only to ameliorate the
harsh results of forfeiture after a vendee's default under the typical
contract for deed. The legislation appears to accomplish this objective
by requiring the contract vendor to pursue the mortgage remedy of
foreclosure as the sole method of terminating the vendee's interest in
tke real estate."I
By focusing on the initial wording of the statute and by combining
aspects of the complete abrogation and foreclosure theories, a third in-
terpretation is feasible. This position suggests that the legislative intent
was to treat the contract for deed in toto as a mortgage only when it is
used for the purposes of financing the sale and of granting the contract
vendee the immediate right to possession. Under this theory of limited
abrogation, the traditional concept of the contract for deed would still
apply whenever the vendee is not granted a possessory right to the real
estate. 12
Arguably all three interpretations of legislative intent are reason-
able, based on the statutory language. Due to the paucity of legislative
history in Oklahoma, however, an investigation into the recorded pur-
poses of this statute is impractical. It is the purpose of this comment to
suggest that the contract for deed still exists to a limited degree and
remains an alternative method for financing the sale of unimproved
7. Estate of Kasishke v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 541 P.2d 848, 851 (Okla. 1975); Johnson v.
Ward, 541 P.2d 182, 184-85 (Okla. 1975); Special Indem. Fund v. Harold, 398 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla.
1964); Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Stephens County, 312 P.2d 883, 885 (Okla. 1957); Woods v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 207 Okla. 490, 492, 251 P.2d 505, 507-08 (1952); Russett School Dist, v.
Askew, 193 Okla. 102, 103, 141 P.2d 575, 577 (1943); Miller v. State, 281 P.2d 441, 446 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1955).
8. Russett School Dist. v. Askew, 193 Okla. 102, 103-04, 141 P.2d 575, 577 (1943); Miller v.
State, 281 P.2d 441, 446 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
9. State ex tel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 262, -, 128 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1964).
10. See notes 110-18 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 119-41 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 142-75 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:557
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real estate in Oklahoma. This limited abrogation interpretation, it is
submitted, is more appropriate than the theories of total abrogation or
of foreclosure, especially when viewed in conjunction with the histori-
cal deficiencies of the prior law.
II. TRADITIONAL LAW
A. The Contract for Deed
The contract for deed is an executory contract for the sale of real
estate. t3 Typically the buyer makes an initial payment towards the
purchase price 14 and enters into possession of the property.'" While in
possession, he pays monthly installments of principal and interest.' 6
Until the final payment by the purchaser, the seller normally retains
legal title to the real estate as his security for the performance of the
contract.' 7 Only upon receipt of the final payment of the purchase
13. See generally Asher v. Hull, 207 Okla. 478, 481, 250 P.2d 866, 870 (1952). See also Nel-
son & Whitman, supra note 3, at 543; Comment, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time For
Reform, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 156, 159 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Florida Installment Land Con-
tracts]; note 2 supra. The contract for deed should be distinguished from a typical contract for the
sale of real estate. The latter is of shorter duration and serves primarily to bind the parties during
the interim between the execution of the contract and the closing of the transaction. Further, it
necessitates only two payments-an initial down payment at the time of the execution of the
contract with the balance paid at the closing. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 541-42.
14. The down payment is usually equivalent to a single monthly installment. This is in con-
trast to conventional mortgage financing. A buyer financing his purchase through a mortgage
transaction may be required to make a down payment of as much as one-third of the purchase
price. See Mixon, Installment Land Contracts.'A Study ofLaw Income Transactions, with Proposals
for Reform anda New Program to Pro vide.Home Ownership in the Inner City, 7 Hous. L. REy. 523,
525-26 (1970). The liberal credit terms usually found in a contract for deed are attractive to the
prospective purchaser who has an unfavorable credit rating. See Warren, California Installment
Land Sales Contracts.: A Timefor Reform, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 608, 625 (1962). The contract
purchaser may also defer most of the closing costs of the transaction until all of the installment
payments are made. A mortgagor, however, does not enjoy this advantage. He must pay all of his
closing costs when the mortgage is granted. See Mixon, supra, at 531.
15. The contract for deed usually provides that the buyer has the right to possession of the
premises during the contract term until he defaults on his contractual obligation. See 3 D. HAR-
VEY, HARVEY'S LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND TITLE CLOSING 402-03 (expan. & recomp. 1978).
See also Mixon, supra note 14, at 528-29. Under the new statute, the buyer should have the right
to remain in possession even after his default. See notes 197-98 infra and accompanying text.
During the contract term, the purchaser is additionally required to keep the premises in good
repair, to pay taxes, to prevent waste, and to maintain insurance. See Nelson & Whitman, supra
note 3, at 540.
16. The purchase price of the property is usually amortized over a fifteen to twenty year
period, although the time may be as short as a year or two. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3,
at 541.
17. See G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 20 (2d ed. 1970). This
retention of legal title is in contrast to the sale of real estate where the seller finances part of the
payment of the purchase price by transferring legal title and taking back a note and mortgage on
the property from the buyer. See notes 57-59 infra and accompanying text. The buyer, however,
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price" is the seller required to execute a deed and to convey marketa-
ble title to the purchaser. 9 Despite its use as a security and financing
device, Oklahoma courts have refused to treat the contract for deed as a
constructive mortgage.2 0
1. The Interests of the Vendor and the Vendee
The rights and obligations of the parties to a contract for deed are
largely determined by the terms of the instrument.2' Nevertheless,
these rights are still subject to certain legal and equitable doctrines
which affect the parties' relationships with each other and with persons
outside the transaction. For purposes of this comment, the most impor-
tant of these doctrines concerns the legal determination of the depen-
dence or independence of the parties' performances 2 and the concept
of equitable conversion.23
In a typical contract for the sale of real estate24---a transaction
which is similar to the contract for deed-the parties' obligations are
mutually dependent.2 5 They are dependent because each party's duty
to perform arises only upon the other party's full performance.2 6 The
seller's obligation to execute a deed and to convey marketable title is
dependent on the buyer's payment of the purchase price. Likewise,
the buyer's duty to pay the purchase price is dependent on the seller's
performance.28
obtains equitable title to the property at the time the last installment is due. See notes 33-38 ilfra
and accompanying text.
18. See Mixon, supra note 14, at 528.
19. See 3 D. HARVEY, supra note 15, at 402-03. The contract for deed, however, could pro-
vide that the seller is required only to execute a quitclaim deed of all his interest in the property.
20. See, e.g., Barker v. Hutton, 109 Okla. 197, 198, 235 P. 170, 171 (1925).
21. See Nix v. Brogan, 118 Okla. 62, 64-65, 251 P. 753, 755 (1925); Banker's Reserve Life Co.
v. Rice, 99 Okla. 184, 186-87, 226 P. 324, 325 (1924); Lee, The Interests Created by the Installment
Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 367, 367 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lee, The Interests Cre-
ateal.
22. See generally 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 637 (1960 & Supp. 1971).
23. See generally 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1159-1166 (5th
ed. 1941).
24. See note 13 supra.
25. Kendall v. Hastings, 200 Okla. 643, 645, 198 P.2d 998, 1000 (1948); Graves v. Chambers,
110 Okla. 1, 2, 236 P. 25, 26 (1925).
26. Kendall v. Hastings, 200 Okla. 643, 645, 198 P.2d 998, 1000 (1948); Graves v. Chambers,
110 Okla. 1, 2, 236 P. 25, 26 (1925); Livingston v. Blair, 104 Okla. 238, 238, 231 P. 82, 83 (1924);
Baumhoffv. Oklahoma City Elec. & Gas & Power Co., 14 Okla. 127, 136-37, 77 P. 40, 43 (1904).
See generally 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 22, § 637, at 45.
27. See Graves v. Chambers, 110 Okla. 1, 2, 236 P. 25, 26 (1925). See 3A A. CORBIN, supra
note 22, §§ 662-663.
28. See Graves v. Chambers, 110 Okla. 1, 2, 236 P. 25, 26 (1925). See 3A A. CORBIN, supra
note 22, §§ 662-663.
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When the parties' obligations under a contract for sale of real es-
tate are mutually dependent, an equitable conversion occurs and equi-
table title to the property passes to the purchaser.2 9 Legal title
however, remains in the seller.3" Under these circumstances, equity
treats the vendor as a trustee of the property for the benefit of the ven-
dee and the vendee as a trustee of the purchase money for the benefit of
the vendor.3 ' The consequence of equitable title's passing to the ven-
dee is that his interest may be further encumbered or subject to claims
from his judgment creditors.32
Under a contract for deed there is no mutuality of obligation,33
and thus no equitable conversion, until the last installment is due. The
vendee's performance is independent of the vendor's duty to perform.
34
29. This equitable conversion depends on the right of one contracting party to enforce specif-
ically the contract against the other. Langley v. Norris, 167 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 1942);
Smith v. Jones, 21 Utah 270, -, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (1900). See generally 4 J. POMEROY, supra note
23, § 1161. A party does not have a right to specific performance until the parties' performances
are mutually dependent. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster, 241 F.2d 178, 183-84 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957); Thompson v. Giddings, 276 P.2d 229, 236 (Okla. 1954); Asher v.
Hull, 207 Okla. 478, 481, 250 P.2d 866, 870 (1952); Kendall v. Hastings, 200 Okla. 643, 645-46, 198
P.2d 998, 1000 (1948); Melton v. Cherokee Oil & Gas Co., 67 Okla. 247, 250, 170 P. 691, 693-94,
cert. denied, 247 U.S. 507 (1917). Thus an equitable conversion does not occur unless the parties'
performances are mutually dependent.
Equity converts the transaction on the philosophy that equity regards things agreed to be
done as actually performed. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908, 910
(10th Cir. 1972); Reigel v. Wood, 110 Okla. 279, 282, 229 P. 556, 558 (1924); Dunn v. Yakish, 10
Okla. 388, 392, 61 P. 926, 927 (1900).
30. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1972); Alfrey
v. Richardson, 204 Okla. 473, 478, 231 P.2d 363, 368 (1951); Whale v. Pearson, 201 Okla. 619, 623,
208 P.2d 552, 556 (1949); Leedy v. Ellis County Fair Ass'n, 188 Okla. 348, 350, 110 P.2d 1099,
1101 (1941); Ware v. Hall, 116 Okla. 70, 73, 243 P. 740, 743 (1925); Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388,
393, 61 P. 926, 927 (1900).
31. Leedy v. Ellis County Fair Ass'n, 188 Okla. 348, 350, 110 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1940); Ware v.
Hall, 116 Okla. 70, 71, 243 P. 740, 742 (1925) (syllabus by the court); Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla.
388, 395, 61 P. 926, 927 (1900).
32. Rand v. Garner, 75 Iowa 311, -, 39 N.W. 515, 515 (1888) (subject to attachment by
contract vendee's judgment creditor); Whitney v. Foster, 117 Mich. 643, -, 76 N.W. 114, 115
(1898) (encumberance); Hook v. Northwestern Thresher Co., 91 Minn. 482, -, 98 N.W. 463, 463-
64 (1904) (subject to attachment by contract vendee's judgment creditor); Standorfv. Shockley, 16
N.D. 73, 1-, 11 N.W. 622, 623 (1907) (encumberance); Welling v. Mount Si Bowl, Inc., 79 Wash.
2d 485, -, 487 P.2d 620, 623-24 (1971) (subject to attachment by contract vendee's judgment
creditor). Compare Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Collins, 85 N.M. 706, -, 516 P.2d 677, 678
(1973) (statute providing that judgment is a lien on the real estate ofjudgment debtor construed to
encompass attachment of a debtor-vendee's interest under a contract for the sale of real estate)
with OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706 (1971) ("Judgments. . . shall be liens on the real estate of the
judgment debtor.").
33. See 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 22, § 664.
34. Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U.S. 564, 577-81 (1893). When one party must
perform or stand ready to perform before the other party is required to perform, the promise of
the party who must perform first is said to be independent, and the other party's performance is
said to be dependent. Livingston v. Blair, 104 Okla. 238, 238, 231 P. 82, 83 (1924); Baumhoffv.
Oklahoma City Elec. & Gas & Power Co., 14 Okla. 127, 136-37, 77 P. 40, 43 (1904).
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The buyer must pay substantially all of the purchase price before the
seller is obligated to execute a deed and to convey marketable title.35 It
is only when the last installment is payable that the parties' perform-
ances become dependent and that equitable title is transferred to the
buyer.36 Absent mutually dependent obligations, however, there is no
equitable conversion. 37 Consequently the purchaser has no equitable
title in the property during most of the contract term.38 Rather, he pos-
sesses merely a contractual right to purchase the real estate 39-a right
which he cannot encumber.4n
35. See Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U.S. 564, 577-81 (1893),
36. See, e.g., Blakely v. McCrory, 274 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 1954); Lansford v. Gloyd. 89
Okla. 232, 236-27, 215 P. 198, 202 (1923); Stanley v. Velma A. Barnes Real Estate, Inc., 571 P.2d
871, 874 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
37. Kendall v. Hastings, 200 Okla. 643, 645, 198 P.2d 998, 1000 (1948); Graves v. Chambers,
110 Okla. 1, 2, 236 P. 25, 26 (1925).
38. Blakely v. McCrory, 274 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 1954); Asher v. Hull, 207 Okla. 478, 481,
250 P.2d 866, 870 (1952); Ezzell v. Endsley, 197 Okla. 194, 195, 169 P.2d 309, 310 (1946); Parks v.
Classen Co., 174 Okla. 237, 237, 49 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1935); Bradford v. Jones, 170 Okla. 636, 638,
41 P.2d 857, 859 (1935); Cullins v. Elerick, 110 Okla. 132, 134, 236 P. 886, 887 (1925); Lansford v.
Gloyd, 89 Okla. 232, 236-37, 215 P. 198, 202 (1923); Stanley v. Velma A. Barnes Real Estate, Inc.,
571 P.2d 871, 873-74 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
39. See Parks v. Classen Co., 156 Okla. 43,45-46,9 P.2d 432, 434 (1932); Stanley v. Velma A.
Barnes Real Estate, Inc., 571 P.2d 871, 874 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). But see State Life Ins. Co. v.
State exrel. Kehn, 192 Okla. 271, 135 P.2d 965 (1942), where the court noted that "a present right
to demand a deed of conveyance is not always a necessary element to an equitable title or benefi-
cial interest in the premises." Id. at 274, 135 P.2d at 968. Several commentators have suggested
that the vendee to a contract for deed has an equitable interest in the property. See, e.g., 4 J.
POMEROY, supra note 23, § 1296, where the author states that "an executory agreement creates
specific equitable interests in the property. ... See also Comment, Installment Land Contracts
for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REv. 240, 243 (1959); Note, TowardAbolishing Install-
ment Land Sale Contracts, 36 MONT. L. REV. 110, 110 (1975). Oklahoma courts appear to make
no distinction between the terms "equitable title" and "equitable interests." See Lansford v.
Gloyd, 89 Okla. 232, 236-37, 215 P. 198, 202 (1923). Accord, Stanley v. Velma A. Barnes Real
State, Inc., 571 P.2d 871, 874 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
40. See Bartlesville Oil & Improvement Co. v. Hill, 30 Okla. 829, 832-34, 121 P. 208, 209-12
(1911); Stanley v. Velma A. Barnes Real Estate, Inc., 571 P.2d 871, 873-74 (Okla. Ct. App.
1977)(no equitable title against which judgment lien could attach).
While the purchaser under a contract for deed has no equitable title which he can encumber,
he may assign his rights under the contract for deed to a third party. Morgan v. Griffith Realty
Co., 192 F.2d 597, 600 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1951); Henry H. Cross Co. v.
Texhoma Oil & Gas Ref. Co., 32 F.2d 442,446-47 (10th Cir. 1929); Landon v. Morehead, 34 Okla.
701, 707, 126 P. 1027, 1029-30 (1912); Harrison v. Osborn, 31 Okla. 103, 106, 114 P. 331, 332
(1911). See generally 3 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 404 (3d ed. & Supp. 1977). On the
other hand, the contract for deed may contain a clause prohibiting assignment of the contract
without the consent of the vendor. Courts have generally upheld these restraints on the basis of
"freedom of contract." Hanigan v. Wheeler, 19 Ariz. App. 49, -, 504 P.2d 972, 974-75 (1972);
Parkinson v. Caldwell, 126 Cal. App. 2d 548,-, 272 P.2d 934, 937 (1954); Immel v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 373 Ill. 256,-, 26 N.E.2d 114, 116 (1940); Andrew v. Meyerdirck, 87 Md. 5 11, -, 40 A. 173,
175-76 (1898). Contra Able v. Gunter, 174 Ala. 389, -, 57 So. 464, 465 (1912). These restraints,
however, appear to be in conflict with the basic philosophy of property law that there should be
free alienability of all interest in land. For this reason, some courts have strictly construed any
clause which prohibits assignment. Hanigan v. Wheeler, 19 Ariz. App. 49, -, 504 P.2d 972, 974-
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2. The Vendor's Remedies on Breach
When dealing with vendor's remedies, Oklahoma courts have tra-
ditionally ignored the distinct similarity between the contract for deed
and the mortgage and instead have focused on the contractual nature
of the vendee's interest a.4  In treating the contract for deed as an execu-
tory contract,42 courts have permitted the nonbreaching seller to pursue
a multiplicity of legal and equitable remedies in removing the default-
ing purchaser from the property and in clearing the title of any de-
fects.4 3
If the contract for deed contained a forfeiture upon default provi-
sion,44 the vendor could retain any payments made under the contract
as liquidated damages.45 Alternatively, the seller could tender back the
75 (1972); Parkinson v. Caldwell, 126 Cal. App. 2d 548, -, 272 P.2d 934, 937 (1954); Detroit
Greyhound Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 381 Mich. 683, -, 167 N.W.2d 274,
277-78 (1969). Even if the purchaser could delegate the performance of the contract to another,
his duty to perform would remain unchanged. Earth Prod. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 441 P.2d 399,
404 (Okla. 1968); Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 481-82, 78 P.2d 697, 699 (1938); Sampson v.
Beeler & Bennett, 103 Okla. 229, 230-31, 229 P. 777, 778-79 (1924); McFarland v. Mayo, 65 Okla.
28, 30-31, 162 P.753, 755 (1916); Minnetonka Oil Co. v. Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co., 27 Okla.
180, 185-93, 111 P. 326, 328-32 (1910). See generally 3 S. WILLISTON, supra, § 411. A party may
not delegate his performance to another if the contract requires that party's special skill, personal
trust, or confidence. Minnetonka Oil Co. v. Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co., 27 Okla. 180, 185-93,
111 P. 326, 328-32 (1910). Because the vendee's obligation to pay the installments and the ven-
dor's duty to convey title do not involve any of these factors, the parties' performances should be
delegable.
41. Courts have developed three distinct approaches to handling the vendor's remedies under
the contract for deed: (1) the quasi-mortgage approach; (2) the compelling equities approach;
and (3) the contract approach. Lewis & Reeves, How The Doctrine of Equitable Conversion Af-
feels Land Sale Contract Forfeitures, 3 R.E.L.J. 249, 254-55 (1974).
42. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
43. If the contract for deed is recorded, it will have the effect of clouding the vendor's title.
See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 67 n. 1 (1976); Lee, Remedies For Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 550, 558 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lee, Remediesfor Breach]; Nelson, The Use of Install-
ment Land Contracts in Missouri-Courting Clouds on Title, 33 J. Mo. B. 161 (1977). See generally
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1 app. (1971 & Supp. 1978) (title examination standards).
44. The contract for deed typically contains a forfeiture clause. See generally 3 D. HARVEY,
supra note 15, at 402-03.
45. Sparks v. Trosper, 186 Okla. 289, 97 P.2d 81 (1939); Cornelius v. Keegan, 172 Okla. 235,
45 P.2d 58 (1935); Eldridge v. Vance, 128 Okla. 46, 261 P. 168 (1927); Lansdale v. Reinhard, 74
Okla. 53, 176 P. 924 (1918). For a case where the court allowed retention of payments made as
liquidated damages absent a contractual provision, see Hill v. Buford, Ill Okla. 148, 239 P. 163
(1925); but see Stone v. Ritzinger, 194 Okla. 653, 153 P.2d 1006 (1944); Nicholson v. Roberts, 144
Okla. 116, 289 P. 331 (1929). Oklahoma statutes provide that penalties imposed by a contract are
void and that liquidated damages clauses are void except in cases where it would be impractical or
extremely difficult to establish actual damages. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 213-215 (1971). A liqui-
dated damages clause, therefore, would only be valid if the amount was reasonable and it would
be impractical or extremely difficult to fix actual damages. Freeman v. Warrior, 409 F.2d 1101,
1103-04 (10th Cir. 1969); Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 769-70 (Okla. 1965); Hudson v.
Elliot, 207 Okla. 676, 680, 252 P.2d 482, 485-86 (1951). In Freeman, the defendant buyer con-
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installments paid by the buyer and sue for damages for breach of con-
tract.46 In an appreciating real estate market, the seller could elect to
rescind the contract,47 to restore everything of value to the vendee, and
to recover possession of the land.48 Finally, if the contract contained a
clause accelerating the balance due of the purchase price, the vendor
could bring a suit to compel the vendee to pay that amount.49
If the buyer remained on the land following default, the seller
could initiate an action in ejectment to regain immediate possession.50
In conjunction with this suit for possession or in an independent suit,
he could bring an equitable action to quiet his title.5 Finally, in the
event the contract for deed was unrecorded and the defaulting buyer
had been coerced into vacating the premises, the seller could choose to
do nothing.5 2
tended that the seller was limited in his recovery for breach to the amount of the liquidated dam-
ages. The court rejected this argument and concluded that the seller could prove and recover his
damages. 409 F.2d at 1103-04.
46. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1972); Freeman v.
Warrior, 409 F.2d 1101 (10th Cir. 1969); Baldwin v. Chappell, 105 Okla. 38, 231 P. 496 (1924).
The measure of the vendor's damages caused by the breach is the excess, if any, of the amount
which would have been due under the contract over the market value of the property. OKLA,
STAT. tit. 23, § 28 (1971). See Freeman v. Warrior, 409 F.2d 1101, 1103-04 (10th Cir. 1969).
Typically, the vendor pursued this remedy when the retention of the installment payments made
proved inadequate to compensate him for his losses incurred as a result of the vendee's breach.
47. King v. Oakley, 434 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1967); Stone v. Ritzinger, 194 Okla. 653, 153 P.2d
2006 (1944); Nicholson v. Roberts, 144 Okla. 116, 289 P. 331 (1929); Simmons v. Harris, 108 Okla.
189, 235 P. 508 (1924); Hurley v. Anicker, 51 Okla. 97, 151 P. 593 (1915). See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15,
§ 233 (1971) (cases when party may rescind). Oklahoma cases have confused the terms "rescind"
and "cancel." In Nicholson v. Roberts, 144 Okla. 116, 289 P. 331 (1929), the court held the terms
were synonymous as used in plaintiffs petition. The court in Ezzell v. Endsley, 197 Okla. 194, 169
P.2d 309 (1946), however, concluded that there existed a clear distinction between recission and
cancellation. They went on to hold that title 15, § 235 of the Oklahoma Statutes, regarding the
duties of a party attempting rescission, did not apply to a suit to cancel a contract for deed and to
quiet title to the property. Thus when the term "cancel" is used, the vendor would primarily be
bringing on action to quiet the title of his property. See Continental Oil Co. v. Bean, 171 Okla. 66,
41 P.2d 678 (1935).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 235 (1971) (duty of party attempting rescission). See cases note 47
supra.
49. See Kouri v. Toma, 198 Okla. 111, 175 P.2d 975 (1947). See Lee, The Interests Created,
supra note 21, at 369-70. In the absence of an option to accelerate the remaining purchase price
upon the buyer's default, a seller could not specifically enforce the contract to compel the buyer to
pay the entire balance owing. Vanderhoffv. Crosby, 11 N.J. Misc. 389, 390, 166 A. 337, 337 (Sup.
Ct. 1933); Robert C. v. Aladdin Knit Mills, Inc., 8 N.C. App. 612, -, 175 S.E.2d 289, 295 (1970).
50. Crowell v. Whitmire, 548 P.2d 221 (Okla. 1976); Asher v. Hull, 207 Okla. 478, 250 P.2d
866 (1953); Ezzell v. Endsley, 197 Okla. 194, 169 P.2d 309 (1946); Stone v. Ritzinger, 194 Okla.
633, 153 P.2d 1006 (1944); Cornelius v. Keegan, 172 Okla. 235, 45 P.2d 58 (1935); Lonsdale v.
Reinhard, 74 Okla. 53, 176 P. 924 (1918).
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1141 (1971) (action to quiet title may be joined with action to
recover possession). See also King v. Oakley, 434 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1967); Asher v. Hull, 207 Olda.
478, 250 P.2d 866 (1953).
52. See Warren, supra note 14, at 629 & n.94, 633.
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3. The Vendee's Remedies on Breach
When the seller was the breaching party,53 the nondefaulting
buyer had three alternative remedies: (1) he could sue to recover any
payments made by rescinding the contract and by restoring everything
of value received;54 (2) he could seek damages for breach;5 5 or (3) he
could bring an equitable action for specific performance of the contract
if it contained an acceleration clause.5 6
B. The Mortgage
For financing the sale of real estate in Oklahoma, the basic alter-
native to the contract for deed is the mortgage. 7 The typical mortgage
transaction involves the seller's transferring legal title to the buyer in
return for a substantial down payment, the buyer's giving his personal
note for the remainder of the purchase price, and a mortgage on the
property.: This purchase money mortgage is the seller's security if the
purchaser defaults on the note. 9 In Oklahoma the mortgage does not
53. The seller's primary obligation under the contract for deed is to convey a marketable title
when all of the installment payments have been made. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying
text. The seller can breach this obligation in numerous ways. First, the vendor could transfer title
to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice which would extinguish the vendee's contractual
right to purchase the property. See Pierce v. Duckett, 157 Okla. 20, 21, 10 P.2d 697, 698 (1932);
Engelkemeier v. Lillis, 54 Okla. 282, 285, 153 P. 877, 878 (1915); Krauss v. Potts, 38 Okla. 674,
684, 135 P. 362, 366 (1913). Second, he may default on a blanket first mortgage which includes the
property under the vendee's contract for deed. Foreclosure by the first mortgagee would prevent
the seller from performing. See Mixon, supra note 14, at 544-47; Warren, supra note 14, at 609-24.
Finally, the vendor may be unable or unwilling to convey a title or a marketable title to the
property when the vendee has paid all of the purchase price. See Mixon, supra note 14, at 545-48;
Warren, supra note 14, at 611.
54. Hawkins v. Wright, 204 Okla. 55, 226 P.2d 957 (1951); Howerton v. Callaway, Carrey &
Foster, 175 Okla. 311, 52 P.2d 845 (1936); Kneeland v. Hetzel, 103 Okla. 3, 229 P. 218 (1924);
Abbott v. Independent Torpedo Co., 98 Okla. 239, 224 P. 708 (1924). See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 15,
§ 235 (1971) (duty of party attempting rescission).
55. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1972). See gener-
ally Lee, Remediesfor Breach, supra note 43, at 567-70. The measure of the damages for the
seller's breach would be the amount of the installments paid and any expenses properly incurred
in examining the title and preparing the necessary papers, with interest on the entire amount.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 27 (1971).
56. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1972). See gener-
ally Lee, Remediesfor Breach, supra note 43, at 570-71. See also note 49 supra. A breaching
vendee rarely enjoyed a similar remedy. Only under unusual circumstances might the court grant
him specific performance of the contract against the vendor. See Palovik v. Absher, 198 Okla.
671, 181 P.2d 989 (1947).
57. Other alternatives to the contract for deed are the deed of trust, OKLA. STAT. tit. 46,
§§ 31-39 (1971 & Supp. 1978), and the deed absolute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 1 (1971).
58. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 213, at 388.
59. Montgomery v. Wade, 195 Okla. 60, 61, 154 P.2d 943, 944 (1945); Clarke v. Clarke, 194
Okla. 455,457, 152 P.2d 908, 910 (1944); Erwin v. Breese, 188 Okla. 391, 393, 109 P.2d 507, 508-09
(1941); Unger v. Shull, 154 Okla. 277, 279, 7 P.2d 881, 883-84 (1932).
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convey any title to the mortgagee,60 but rather it is merely a lien on the
property.6 '
Because the mortgage is only a lien on the title rather than a con-
veyance, the mortgagor-buyer retains the incidents of legal ownership.
Consequently he may encumber his title further 62 or convey it to an-
other subject to the seller's mortgage.63 Likewise, he has a right to pos-
session of the property until the mortgage is judicially foreclosed.64
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, §§ 5, 10 (1971). See Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla.
1967); In re Baxter, 132 Okla. 289, 289-90, 270 P. 565, 566 (1928); In re Rolater, 67 Okla. 215, 216,
170 P. 507, 508 (1918); Litz v. Exchange Bank, 15 Okla. 564, 570, 83 P. 790, 792 (1905).
61. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, §§ 1, 5, 10 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 3 (1971). See also
Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967); Abraham v. Mike, 178 Okla. 594, 599, 63 P.2d
743, 746 (1936); Pierce v. Duckett, 157 Okla. 20, 21, 10 P.2d 697, 698 (1932). Other jurisdictions,
however, hold that the mortgagee may have certain incidents of the legal title which are greater
than a mere lien on the property. See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 14, for a discussion
of these title and intermediate theory jurisdictions.
62. See Smith v. Varney, 309 A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1973), See generally G. OSBORNE, supra
note 17, § 249.
63. Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967). Accord, Chason v. O'Neal, 158 Ga.
725, -, 124 S.E. 519, 522 (1924); Campbell v. Jones, 230 S.W. 710, 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1921). See
generally Cunningham & Tischler, Transfer of the Real Estate Mortgagor's Interest, 27 RUTGERS
L. REv. 24 (1973). Typically, the mortgagee may try to restrict the mortgagor's ability to transfer
the mortgaged property without the mortgagor's written consent. A common device used is the
"due on sale" clause. It provides that a conveyance of the mortgaged premises without the written
consent of the mortgagee shall entitle the mortgagee, at his option, to declare the entire indebted-
ness as due and to foreclose the mortgage if the balance is not paid immediately. See Continental
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977). For a discussion of the validity of
these "due on sale" clauses in Oklahoma, see generally Vyhnal, Continental Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Fetter, The "Due on Sale" Clause: The Need to Divide and Articulate ts Dual
Functions in the Mortgage Contract, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 898 (1978). The mortgagor may transfer the
property "subject" to the mortgage. In this case, the transferee does not become personally liable
for the underlying obligations. Instead, the debt is to be satisfied out of the land with the trans-
feror being only secondarily liable. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 170 Okla. 34, 35, 38 P.2d
564, 565 (1935); Dean v. McMichael, 168 Okla. 536, 538, 33 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1934); Johnson v.
Davis, 146 Okla. 170, 172, 293 P. 197, 198 (1930); Beckett v. Harris, 115 Okla. 219, 221-22, 242 P.
561,563 (1925); Snaderson v. Turner, 73 Okla. 105,-, 174 P. 763, 763-64 (1918). See general' G.
OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 252. Alternatively, the mortgagor may sell the mortgaged property
where the buyer expressly or impliedly agrees to become personally liable on the debt secured by
the mortgage. U.S.I.F. Norman Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 534 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1974);
State exrel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Pitts, 197 Okla. 644, 646, 173 P.2d 923, 925 (1946); Strange
v. Maloney, 178 Okla. 65, 67, 61 P.2d 725, 727 (1936). See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17,
§ 253. As between the mortgagor and the purchaser, the purchaser becomes the principal debtor,
while original mortgagor occupies the position of a surety. Stalcup v. Easterly, 351 P.2d 735, 738
(Okla. 1960); Harden v. American First Nat'1 Bank, 154 Okla. 11, 13, 6 P.2d 1060, 1062 (1932);
Sawyer v. Balmsen, 102 Okla. 41, 44, 226 P. 344, 345 (1924); Scott v. Norris, 62 Okla. 292, 294, 162
P. 1085, 1087 (1917). See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 259. If the purchaser assumes
the mortgage, the mortgagee may sue personally either the original mortgagor or the assuming
purchaser or both on the underlying obligation. McBirney v. Bader, 181 Okla. 237, 240, 73 P.2d
156, 159 (1937); Page v. Hinchee, 174 Okla. 537, 540, 51 P.2d 487, 489-90 (1935).
64. Morgan v. Atkinson, 203 Okla. 111, 112, 218 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1950); Yingling v.
Redwine, 12 Okla. 64, 67-78, 69 P. 810, 811 (1902). Judicial foreclosure is the sole method of
terminating the defaulting mortgagor's interest in the property. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971).
The mortgagor has a right to any profits and rents from the property until there is a judicial
10
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If the mortgagor-buyer defaults on his obligation, the mortgagee-
seller typically has the option of accelerating the payment of the entire
indebtedness.65 The mortgagee-seller may then either sue the mortga-
gor-buyer personally on the note66 or sue to foreclose his mortgage67 or
both.68
Under a judicial foreclosure, the realty must be sold at a public
auction.69 The net proceeds of this public sale are applied first to the
foreclosure. Tiger v. Sellers, 145 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1945); Mart v. Bingman, 171 Okla. 429,
433, 43 P.2d 447, 451 (1935) (per curiam). Moreover, any provision in the mortgage giving the
mortgagee the right to possession, profits, or rents upon default is contrary to public policy and is,
therefore, invalid. Id. at 432, 43 P.2d at 449. If the mortgagee wishes to protect his security inter-
est from any deterioration in the hands of the defaulting vendee during the pendency of the fore-
closure action, he may petition the court for the appointment of a receiver. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
1551 (1971). See Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Rusch, 183 Okla. 145, 80 P.2d 639 (1938); Hart v.
Bingham, 171 Okla. 429, 43 P.2d 447 (1935); Exchange Trust Co. v. Oklahoma State Bank, 126
Okla. 193, 259 P. 589 (1927). Appointment of a receiver, however, is within the discretion of thl;
court. Anthony v. Smoot, 183 Okla. 85, 87, 80 P.2d 259, 260 (1938); Stephens v. Mortgage Bond
Co., 170 Okla. 111, 113, 38 P.2d 930, 932 (1935); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Crook, 144 Okla.
105, 110, 289 P. 728, 730 (1930). The mortgagee must establish to the satisfaction of the court that
the property mortgaged is insufficient in its value to satisfy the debt, Zenith Limestone Co. v.
Exchange Trust Co., 169 Okla. 215, 216, 36 P.2d 725, 726 (1934); Jacobs v. Real Estate Mortgage
Trust Co., 122 Okla. 1, 3, 249 P. 930, 932 (1926); or that the mortgagor is committing waste on the
property. Harding v. Garber, 20 Okla. 11, 21, 93 P. 539, 543 (1907).
If the mortgagee actually enters into possession of the premises with the consent of the mort-
gagor, Underhill v. Miller, 197 Okla. 657, 658, 174 P.2d 249, 250-51 (1946), without his permis-
sion, but peacefully, Higgs v. Renfrow, 195 Okla. 545, 548, 159 P. 2d 749, 751 (1945), he becomes a
mortgagee-in-possession and he may remain until the obligation is paid, Underhill v. Miller, 197
Okla. 657, 658, 174 P. 2d 249, 250-51 (1946), or the mortgagor's equity of redemption is foreclosed.
Morgan v. Atkinson, 203 Okla. 111, 112, 218 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1950).
The mortgagor's right to possession until foreclosure, despite a default on the underlying
obligation, should be contrasted with the vendee's right to possession under a contract for deed.
Absent a contractual provision, the vendee has no right to possession of the property until he has
paid all of the purchase price and the vendor has executed and delivered a deed. See Wilson v.
Sanchez, 116 Cal. App. 2d 670,-, 254 P.2d 594, 597 (1955); Nuquist v. Bauscher, 71 Idaho 89, -,
227 P.2d 83, 86 (1951); Duff v. United States Trust Co., 327 Mass. 17, -, 97 N.E.2d 189, 192
(1951); Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, -,423 P.2d 491,494 (1967); Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wash.
2d 441, -, 206 P.2d 300, 303 (1949). Moreover, the vendor would be entitled to possession, prof-
its, and rents upon the vendee's default. See Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, -, 423 P.2d
491, 494 (1967).
65. See Luke v. Patterson, 192 Okla. 631, 634, 139 P.2d 175, 178 (1943); Bollenbach v. Lud-
lur, 84 Okla. 14, 15, 201 P. 982, 983 (1921); Jones v. Hubbard, 37 Okla. 592, 592, 132 P. 1082,
1082 (1913); Flesher v. Hubbard, 37 Okla. 587, 591, 132 P. 1080, 1082 (1913).
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971). See Irwin v. Sands, 265 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1954);
First Nat'l Bank v. Colonial Trust Co., 66 Okla. 106, 109, 167 P. 985, 987-88 (1917); Echols v.
Reeburgh, 62 Okla. 67, 69, 161 P. 1065, 1067 (1916).
67. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971). See Irwin v. Sands, 265 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1954);
First Nat'l Bank v. Colonial Trust Co., 66 Okla. 106, 109, 167 P. 985, 987-88 (1917); Echols v.
Reeburgh, 62 Okla. 67, 69, 161 P. 1065, 1067 (1916).
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971). See Irwin v. Sands, 65 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1954);
First Nat'l Bank v. Colonial Trust Co., 66 Okla. 106, 109, 167 P. 985, 987-988 (1917); Echols v.
Reeburgh, 62 Okla. 67, 69, 161 P. 1065, 1067 (1916).
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971). See Berke v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 192 Okla.
124, 125, 134 P.2d 346, 347 (1943).
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payment of the remaining debt secured by the mortgage.70 Any surplus
is then distributed to subordinate lien holders, according to their priori-
ties,7' and to the mortgagor-buyer 72 respectively. If the sale does not
yield an amount sufficient to satisfy the obligation due, the mortgagee-
seller can obtain a personal judgment against the mortgagor-buyer for
any deficiency.73
An inherent part of every mortgage is the mortgagor-buyer's statu-
torily-created right of redemption.74 This right exists in the mortgagor-
buyer from the instant the mortgage is created until the mortgage is
discharged or foreclosed. 75 Moreover, it entitles the defaulting mortga-
gor-buyer to redeem the property from the mortgage by paying the
amount owing on the note at any time prior to foreclosure.76
C. The Harsh Realities of the Contractfor Deed
The purchase money mortgage and the contract for deed have pro-
70. See United States v. Rahar's Inn, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 459, 461 (D. Mass. 1965); In re
Carter, 56 F. Supp. 385, 388 (W.D. Va. 1944); Tolzman v. Gwynn, 267 Md. 92, -, 296 A.2d 594,
97 (1972).
71. Dockrey v. Gray, 172 Cal. App. 2d 388, -, 341 P.2d 746, 748-49 (1959); Great S. Land
Co. v. Valley Sec. Co., 162 Miss. 120, -, 137 So. 510, 514 (1931); O'Brien v. Slefkin, 88 R.I. 264,
-, 147 A.2d 183, 185 (1959); Kaplan v. Ruffin, 213 Va. 551, -, 193 S.E.2d 689, 692 (1973).
72. In re Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n, 308 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1962); Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Mildenberger, 359 S.W.2d 380, 384-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Manchester Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Emery Waterhouse Co., 102 N.H. 288, -, 153 A.2d 918, 920 (1959).
73. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971). See R.F.C. v. Breeding, 211 F.2d 385, 390-91 (10th Cir.
1954); Van Eman v. Mosing, 36 Okla. 555, 557, 129 P. 2, 3 (1912).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 18 (1971). See Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967).
See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, §§ 302-306.
Three related concepts should be distinguished: a mortgagor's equity of redemption; a mort-
gagor's statutorily-created right to redeem; and a right of statutory redemption. A mortgagor's
equity of redemption was the outgrowth of the excesses and harshness of the common law mort-
gage. Early English courts of equity intervened to aid the mortgagor who had failed to pay
promptly the mortgage debt. A mortgagor could redeem his property from the mortgagee if he
tendered the principal and interest within a reasonable time after default. This equity of redemp-
tion eventually was recognized as an equitable estate in land. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 17,§§ 6-7. Because Oklahoma follows a "lien" theory of mortgages, the mortgagor is deemed to
hold both legal and equitable title to the property. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
It is, therefore, conceptually incorrect to classify the mortgagor's interest as an equity of redemp-
tion. Thus, in lieu of an equity of redemption, Oklahoma has a statutorily-created mortgagor's
right to redeem. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 18 (1971). The equity of redemption and a statutorily-
created right to redeem exist only until foreclosure. Some states by statute allow redemption by
the mortgagor for a certain period of time after the foreclosure sale. This is commonly known as
the right of statutory redemption. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (1976); G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 8.
75. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 18 (1971). See Coursey v. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967).
See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, §§ 302-306.
76. The effect of redemption is to restore to the mortgagor his entire estate to the extent
which he would have had if the mortgage transaction had never occurred. Coursey v. Fairchild,
436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967).
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vided the same economic function-the financing of the unpaid portion
of the purchase price by the seller.77 Both instruments have served as
security devices for the vendor.78 Despite there being no major func-
tional difference between these two forms of land financing, Oklahoma
courts have continued to ignore the substantive similarities and to per-
petuate a formalistic distinction, presumably on the basis of the free-
dom to contract.79
Because Oklahoma courts have seemed to emphasize form over
substance, the contract for deed has been an attractive financing alter-
native for the vendor, especially since the substantive mortgage law has
been weighted heavily in favor of the mortgagor-purchaser.8 0 The ba-
sic attraction for the vendor has been the relative simplicity and econ-
omy of terminating the vendee's interest in the event of his default.8 '
Additionally, the contract for deed has provided the vendor with an
effective means of mass-merchandising both undeveloped land and
low-income housing on liberal credit terms to individuals who have
virtually no credit ratings.8 2 Likewise, from the perspective of the po-
tential purchaser, the contract for deed may have been the only realistic
method of entering into the housing market without first making the
sizable down payment commonly associated with conventional mort-
gage financing. 3
Despite its apparent utility as a tool for increasing the availability
of real estate financing, the contract for deed raised many inherent title
problems for the purchaser. Because the contract for deed usually did
not meet the statutory requirements for recordation,84 the vendee lost
77. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 541.
78. See general' Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391 (1965-
1966); Florida Installment Land Contracts, supra note 13, at 157; Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa
Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REv. 786, 786 (1960-1961).
79. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 20, at 29; Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 543;
Florida Installment Land Contracts, supra note 13, at 176.
80. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 11 (1971).
81. See Lee, Defaulting Purchaser's Right to Restitution Under the Installment Land Contract,
20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 19 (1965). See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 20.
82. Warren, supra note 14, at 625.
83. See generally Comment, Reforming the Vendor's Remediesfor Breach ofInstallment Land
Sale Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 191, 193-98 (1973-1974). See also Mixon, supra note 14.
84. Oklahoma law requires that before an instrument affecting real estate can be recorded, it
must be executed and acknowledged. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 26, 33 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 49,
§ 107 (Supp. 1978). Generally a contract for deed is not acknowledged by the seller. See Mixon,
supra note 14, at 545, 547; Warren, supra note 14, at 613, 629. But see Nelson & Whitman, supra
note 3, at 571, where the authors suggest that the execution and recording by the vendee of an
affidavit containing the terms of the contract, or the use of a "straw man" and subsequent reas-
signment back to the vendee, would effectively circumvent this problem.
1979]
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all his rights and investment in the property if the vendor subsequently
sold the land to a bona fide purchaser for value.85 If the vendor be-
came bankrupt during the term of the contract, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy had the power to cancel the contract because of its executory
nature.86 A similar result occurred when the vendor merely defaulted
on a first mortgage which covered the property subject to the vendee's
contract for deed. In this instance foreclosure by the vendor's mortga-
gee terminated the vendee's rights or claims to the property.8 7 Thus the
vendee, despite faithful performance of his obligation to pay the install-
ments, was subject to having his interest completely terminated due to
circumstances beyond his control.
More likely, however, was the situation where the vendee, after
full performance, took title to the land subject to various liens which
the vendor had failed to remove by the time he was obligated to con-
vey. This was possible under a contract for deed because the vendor
typically agreed to convey marketable title only when the purchaser
had made all the payments.8 Absent fraud or misrepresentation,89
there was no requirement that the vendor have title or marketable title
at the time the contract for deed was created.90 Concomitantly, the
vendor had no duty to clear his title of defects until final payment was
made.91 Thus the vendee was placed in the precarious position of hav-
ing to continue to perform without any real assurance that the vendor
would be able to convey marketable title.92 Consequently the vendee
85. This assumes that the bona fide purchaser had no actual or constructive notice of the
vendee's contractual interest in the property. Absent recordation or some other indicia of owner-
ship such as open and notorious possession, the bona fide purchaser would take good title to the
property free of the contract vendee's rights. Metzger v. Mueller, 205 Okla. 490,491,438 P.2d 802,
803-04 (1951); Alfrey, v. Richardson, 204 Okla. 473, 478, 231 P.2d 363, 367 (1951). See generally
Warren, supra note 14, at 614.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976). See e.g., In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F.
Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Accord, Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (ist Cir. 1963);
In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1960). See generally Lacy, Land Sale
Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 477 (1974); Lynn, Bankruptcy and the Land Sales
Contract: The Rights of the Vendee Vi-A- Vis the Vendor's Bankruptcy Trustee, E Tex. TEC1. L.
REv. 677 (1974); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 567-68; Florida Installment Land Contracts,
supra note 13, at 180.
87. See Mixon, supra note 14, at 546-47; Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12
WAYNE L. REV. 391, 414-15 (1965-1966); Warren, supra note 14, at 610-11. See generaly Ran-
dolph, The Installment Land Contract as a Junior Lien Security, 54 MICH. L. REv. 929 (1956).
88. See Lee, The Interests Created, supra note 21, at 368.
89. Id. For an Oklahoma case dealing with fraud, see generally Mazey v. Anthis, 49 OKLA.
B.A.J, 998 (1978).
90. See Lee, The Interests Created, supra note 21, at 368.
91. See Luette v. Bank of Italy, 42 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 884 (1930).
92. See Lee, The Interests Created, supra note 21, at 368; Mixon, supra note 14, at 547-48;
Warren, supra note 14, at 611.
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often found that his interest, despite full performance on his part, was
inferior to interests held by third parties. 93
Perhaps the most inequitable aspect of the contract for deed was
the forfeiture provisions94 that were customarily enforced in favor of
the vendor against a breaching vendee.15 Unlike the mortgagor, the
breaching vendee had no right of redemption. Instead of pursuing the
costly and time-consuming foreclosure procedures required of a mort-
gagee, the vendor merely retained the installments paid and terminated
the vendee's interest.96 The inequity of a forefeiture was magnified
when the purchaser had already made numerous installments. Forfei-
ture in this situation resulted in a substantial loss to the buyer and a
windfall gain to the seller. The anomaly of the situation was that the
closer the vendee came to full payment of the purchase price, the less
need the seller had for security-and yet the greater the impact of for-
feiture on the vendee. Therefore, as the contract term neared comple-
tion, the results of forfeiture were not only harsh but were also
unreasonable.97
Presumably, when it passed the statute, the Oklahoma legislature
was cognizant both of the inherent deficiences of the contract for deed
and of its use by vendors to avoid the substantive law of mortgages,
including the exclusive remedy of judicial foreclosure. 98 Thus it is ap-
propriate to analyze the statutory language in light of the setting in
which the contract for deed was traditionally used.99
93. Generally, the contract vendee's unrecorded interest was inferior to claims of the ven-
dor's judgment creditors, mechanics' liens, and subsequent encumberances by the seller. See War-
ren, supra note 14, at 611-24. The vendee's interest may also be inferior to federal tax liens. Id.
See Leipert v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323
(1976). But see Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 568-70.
94. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
95. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 543.
96. Lee, Remediesfor Breach, supra note 43, at 561; Comment, Forfeiture: TheAnomaly of the
Land Sale Contract, 41 ALB. L. REv. 71, 74 (1977); Florida Installment Land Contracts, supra note
13, at 157-58, 175; Note, Installment Land Contract-Mortgage or Contract, 26 U. MIAMi L. REV.
855, 859 (1972).
97. Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), where the Indiana Supreme
Court held that forfeiture of over half af the contract price would be "clearly excessive" and
"unreasonable" and would result in "substantial injustice" if permitted. Id. at -, 301 N.E.2d at
645-46.
98. In enacting statutes the legislature is presumed to be aware of the local conditions and to
have acted with sufficient knowledge of the needs of the people. Gates v. Easter, 354 P.2d 438, 441
(Okla. 1960).
99. "A statute cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was passed,
and from the evil which. . . [the legislature] sought to correct and prevent." United States v.
Champlin Ref. Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297 (1951).
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III. INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW LEGISLATION
A. Methodology
The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and to
effectuate the true intent and meaning of the legislature.' 0 Initially
this task must be accomplished by looking to the actual language of the
whole statute.' 0 ' If the statutory language is plain and unambiguous
and clearly expresses the legislative intent, then no occasion exists for
judicial construction,' 2 and the language must be followed without ad-
ditional inquiry. 3 If, however, the language is susceptible of several
meanings, then the rules of interpretation 104 may be used to resolve the
doubt and ambiguity.'0 5
Undoubtedly the statute 0 6 clearly evinces an intent to make a
change in the existing law relating to contracts for deed. °7 Likewise, it
is beyond question that the statute plainly manifests a desire to have
mortgage law apply to the contract for deed. It is difficult to suggest
with the same degree of certainty, however, that when mortgage law
applies to the contract for deed it does so to the utmost degree. It is at
this point that the plain meaning of the statute disappears, for there are
several possible interpretations of the statutory language, each provid-
100. See, e.g., Tannehill v. Special Indem. Fund, 538 P.2d 590, 592 (Okla. 1975); Buckness v.
State Indus. Court, 512 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Okla. 1973); Special Indem. Fund v. Harold, 398 P.2d
827, 830 (Okla. 1964); Oliver v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 359 P.2d 183, 187
(Okla. 1961); Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Stephens County, 312 P.2d 883, 885 (Okla. 1957).
101. See, e.g., Special Indem. Fund v. Harold, 398 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla. 1964); In re Oklahoma
Turnpike Auth., 365 P.2d 345, 355 (Okla. 1961); Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Stephens
County, 312 P.2d 883, 885 (Okla. 1957); Russett School Dist. v. Askew, 193 Okla. 102, 103, 141
P.2d 575, 577 (1943).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1973); Oldham v. Drummond
Bd. of Educ., 542 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Okla. 1975); Lancaster v. State ex rel. Harrod, 426 P.2d 714,
716 (Okla. 1967); In re Guardianship of Campbell, 450 P.2d 203, 205 (Okla. 1966); Abshire v.
State, 551 P.2d 273, 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
103. Estate of Kasishke v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 541 P.2d 848, 851 (Okla. 1975); Johnson v.
Ward, 541 P.2d 182, 184-85 (Okla. 1975); Special Indem. Fund v. Harold, 398 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla.
1964).
104. While there are courts and commentators who distinguish the terms interpretation and
construction, for purposes of this comment the terms will be used interchangeably. See generally
2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 45.04.
105. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 199 Okla. 193, 195, 185 P.2d 211, 212 (1947); Russett School Dist.
v. Askew, 193 Okla. 102, 103, 141 P.2d 575, 577 (1943); Exparte Higgs, 97 Okla. Crim. 334, 341,
263 P.2d 752, 756 (1954). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 45.02. One commenta-
tor suggests that the judicial invocation of the plain meaning rule, in reality, indicates "that the
court has already considered and construed" the statute. Id.
106. See note 1 supra.
107. Cf. Irwin v. Irwin, 433 P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1965) (amendment to a statute which had a
judicially settled meaning may reasonably indicate legislative intent to alter the law). Accord,
Gordon v. Browning, 572 P.2d 603, 605 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
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ing an answer to the question of the extent to which substantive mort-
gage law will apply to the contract for deed.
One construction suggests that the traditional concept of the con-
tract for deed in Oklahoma is completely abrogated by the new statute.
Another, more restrictive interpretation provides that the contract for
deed is subject to the mortgage rules relating to foreclosure only. Fi-
nally, an intermediate approach between these two interpretations
treats the contract for deed as identical to a mortgage only when it is
used as a means of financing the real state transaction and when the
vendee is given the immediate right to possession. Under this limited
abrogation theory, the absence either of the financing element or of the
possession factor will result in the continuing viability of common law
concepts governing the contract for deed.
Because the language of the new legislation lends itself to these
three plausible constructions, Oklahoma courts will have to resort to
rules of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity and to discover
the intent of the legislature.' 08 The next section of this comment will
apply interpretive aids'0 9 to determine the viability of each of these
three theories. It will conclude that the limited abrogation theory is the
most reasonable and sensible interpretation of the legislative intent.
B. Application of the Rules of Statutory Construction
1. Complete Abrogation Theory
Under a complete abrogation theory, the contract for deed would
no longer exist in any common law form. This is the approach taken
by several commentators" 0 who contend that the import of the new
legislation is to render obsolete the concept of contract for deed in
Oklahoma."'
This interpretation, however, is not only logically inconsistent, but
it also conflicts with a canon of statutory construction. Oklahoma
courts generally have preferred a statutory construction that gives effect
to the entire act by rendering every word, phrase, and clause opera-
108. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 45.02.
109. Interpretative aids for statutory construction are generally divided into two categories:
intrinsic aids and extrinsic aids. Intrinsic aids derive the statute's meaning from an examination
of the internal structure of the text. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, §§ 45.14, 47.01-.38. Ex-
trinsic aids, on the other hand, consist of background information about circumstances which led
to the statute's enactment, events surrounding its enactment, legislative history, and developments
pertaining to its subsequent operation. Id. §§ 45.14, 48.01-.20.
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tive. 112 Application of this rule, moreover, forces a result that is con-
trary to the complete abrogation model. The beginning phrase of the
new legislation indicates that the statute only applies when the contract
for deed is used "for the purpose or with the intention of receiving the
payment of money and made for the purpose of establishing an imme-
diate and continuing right of possession of the described real prop-
erty." " 3 Thus, absent these conditions the statute is inapplicable, and
traditional concepts relating to the contract for deed should continue to
govern. Clearly the introductory phrase of the new statute serves the
purpose of delimiting the statute's applicability to contracts for deed.' 1 4
Notwithstanding the rules of construction which militate against a
complete abrogation approach, a more persuasive argument can be
made based on the lack of simplicity in this interpretation of the statu-
tory language. Had the legislature intended to abolish the common law
doctrine of contract for deed, it easily could have stated that intention
in a more succinct manner. The legislative elimination of the deed ab-
solute" 5 as an alternative method of financing real estate sales in
Oklahoma is an example of the use of plain, simple language to achieve
a certain objective. There the statutory language provided that when-
ever the parties to a transaction intended the deed absolute "to be de-
feasible or as security for the payment of money, [it] shall be deemed a
mortgage and must be recorded and foreclosed as such.""' 6 Because
the legislative intention was clearly exposed, courts have had little
trouble in applying the statute." 7 A similarly worded statement would
have been sufficient to terminate the contract for deed had the legisla-
112. General Motors Corp. v. Cook, 528 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Okla. 1974); Hamrick v. George,
378 P.2d 324, 327 (Okla. 1963); Matthews v. Rucker, 67 Okla. 218, 219, 170 P. 492, 493 (1918).
Such a construction is preferable to one rendering some words nugatory. Street v. Bethany Fire-
men's Relief& Pension Fund Bd., 555 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Okla. 1976); City of Tulsa v. Goins, 437
P.2d 257, 259 (Okla. 1967); Spurrier v. Mallouf, 184 Okla. 251, 252, 86 P.2d 995, 997 (1939).
113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § I1 A (Supp. 1978). See note 1 supra.
114. There is a presumption that each phrase in a statute is designed and intended by the
legislature to have some useful purpose. Whiteis v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 531 F.2d 968, 973 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Hunt v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 381 P.2d 844,
847 (Okla. 1963); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State ex rel. Vassar, 187 Okla. 164, 166, 101 P.2d
793, 796, (1940).
115. Under a deed absolute transaction, the debtor-grantor executes an absolute deed of con-
veyance to his creditor-grantee who orally or expressly agrees to hold title to the property as
security only and to reconvey it to the debtor-grantor when the obligation is paid. See generally
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND DEVELOP-
MENT 20-23 (1976).
116. OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 1 (1971).
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ture so desired. Thus it can be confidently suggested that the complete
abrogation theory was not the approach envisioned by the legisla-
ture. 1 18
2. Foreclosure Theory
The foreclosure model suggests that the legislature intended to
subject the contract for deed to the rules regarding mortgage foreclo-
sure only. This approach, a more restrictive construction of the statu-
tory language, derives strong support from the canons of statutory
construction. Nevertheless, this theory is deficient in that it fails to re-
solve all the significant problems that were inherent in the traditional
law governing contracts for deed and that were presumably in the
minds of the legislators at the time the statute was enacted. 119
Ejusdem generis, a rule of statutory construction, requires that gen-
eral words which follow specific words in a statutory scheme be given a
construction that is limited by the interpretation ascribed to the specific
words. 12o Likewise, where the general terms precede the specific terms,
the rule of ejusdem generis is equally applicable and restricts the tenor
of the general terms to the aim of the specific terms.12 1
A pertinent part of the new legislation states: "All contracts for
deed. . . shall. . . be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be sub-
ject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, re-
straints, and forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages." 122
Application of the rule of ejusdem generis requires the conclusion that
the specific phrase, "subject to the same rules of foreclosure," restricts
the meaning of both the preceding and succeeding general phrases. 123
118. An unreasonable result produced by one possible interpretation of an act should be re-
jected in favor of another interpretation which would produce a reasonable result. Becknell v.
State Indus. Court, 512 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Okla. 1973); In re Kyle's Autopsy, 309 P.2d 1070, 1073
(Okla. 1957); State ex rel. Williamson v. Longmire, 281 P.2d 949, 955 (Okla. 1955); Brown v. State
ElectionBd., 197 Okla. 169, 171, 170 P.2d 200, 202 (1946).
119. See note 98 supra.
120. Nucholls v. Board of Adjustment, 560 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Okla. 1976); Board of Comm'rs
v. Grimes, 75 Okla. 219, 220, 182 P. 897, 897 (1919); Smith v. State, 79 Okla. Crim. 1, 24-25, 151
P.2d 74, 85-86 (1944). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 47.17, at 103-04 & n.3.
121. In re Cent. Airlines, 199 Okla. 300, 303-04, 185 P.2d 919, 923-24 (1947); In re Spartan
Airlines, 199 Okla. 305, 305-06, 185 P.2d 925, 926 (1947). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra
note 6, § 47.17, at 103-04 & n.4.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 1 A (Supp. 1978). See note I supra for the text of the statute.
123. The legislators are presumed, not only to know the rules of statutory construction, but
also to expect the courts to rely on them in construing legislation. See Wimberly v. Deacon, 195
Okla. 561, 563, 144 P.2d 447, 450 (1944). See also Note, Statutory Construction-Doctrine of Ejus-
dem Generls, 17 VA. L. REv. 511, 513 (1930-31) [hereinafter cited as Doctrine ofEjusdem Generis].
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Therefore, when the statute is applicable, 24 the contract for deed is
subject only to mortgage foreclosure concepts and to no other aspect of
mortgage law.
Further support for this position can be gleaned from a compari-
son of the pertinent terms. Without a doubt, the "regulations, re-
straints, and forms" of mortgages clearly encompass the "rules of
foreclosure." Arguably, had the legislature intended to apply all as-
pects of mortgage law to the contract for deed, there was no need to
mention specifically the term foreclosure. Moreover, if the specific
words relating to foreclosure are given full effect, 2 5 the general words
are partially redundant. The doctrine of ejusdem generis resolves this
apparent conflict by giving effect to both the specific and the general
words. The rule accomplishes this task "by treating the particular
words as indicating a class, and the general words as extending the pro-
visions of the statute to everything embraced in that class, though not
specifically named by the particular words."' 26 Thus, by applying the
rule, the presumption against superfluous and redundant statutory lan-
guage can be satisfied. 27
While ejusdem generis is a well established and useful rule, 2 8
it is, like other canons of statutory construction, only an aid to
the ascertainment of the true meaning of the statute. It is
neither final nor exclusive. To ascertain the meaning of the
words of a statute, they may be submitted to the test of all
appropriate canons of statutory construction, of which the
rule of ejusdem generis is only one.12 9
Modem commentators have also criticized the rule in that the intent of
124. See notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
126. National Bank of Commerce v. Estate of Ripley, 161 Mo. 126, 131, 61 S.W. 587, 588
(1901). See generally Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis, supra note 123, at 513-16.
127. Courts presume that the legislature did not use superfluous or redundant words in the
statute. See Cromer v. J.W. Jones Const. Co., 79 N.M. 179, -, 441 P.2d 219, 244 (Ct. App. 1968);
Lynch v. Owen J. Roberts School Dist., 430 Pa. 461, -, 244 A.2d 1, 5 (1968); Associated Hosp.
Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d447, -, 109 N.W.2d 271,279 (1961). Seegenerally2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 47.17.
128. One court noted that the doctrine is supported by decisions in almost every state. Brent v.
Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, -, 240 S.W. 45, 48 (1922). Commentators have suggested that the
rule is "universally accepted." See, e.g., Doctrine ofEjusdem Generis, supra note 123, at 513.
129. Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934). In Oklahoma, the doc-
trine of ejusdem generir is not one of mandatory application. See Stokes v. State, 366 P.2d 425,
429 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961). See also Baccus v. Pankratz, 200 Okla. 390, 390, 194 P.2d 880, 881
(1948) (syllabus by the court); Baccus v. Banks, 199 Okla. 647, 650-51, 192 P.2d 683, 687, appeal
dismissed sub nom., Reeder v. Banks, 333 U.S. 858 (1948). For the general limitations on the
doctrine, see generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, §§ 47.20-.22.
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the legislature is often contrary to the construction achieved by the use
of the rule. 13' They argue that the legislative intent is generally to enu-
merate specific conditions that are on the legislator's minds, but not to
limit the operation of the statute to the specific conditions listed.' 3 '
Others have suggested that, because the rule of ejusdem generis requires
strict construction of the statutory language, rigid adherence to the rule
is inappropriate where a statute is remedial in nature. 32 This approach
is consistent with the legislative mandate that statutes in derogation of
common law concepts are to be given liberal construction. 133 Clearly
the new statute is remedial since it provides relief not available at com-
mon law for the defaulting vendee. Concomitantly, the statute, under
any theory, restricts common law rights. Therefore, the application of
the rule ejusdem generis, which requires a strict approach to interpreta-
tion of the statutory language, is not only inconsistent with the general
remedial flavor of the statute, but it is also contrary to an express legis-
lative mandate.
In resolving the ambiguity of a statute, courts often analyze and
evaluate the background information concerning the circumstances
which led to a statute's enactment.13 4 This method of analysis gener-
ally necessitates consideration of the law, along with its deficiencies,
prior to the passage of the legislation.135 Additionally, the legislators
are presumed to have been aware not only of the prior law but also of
the circumstances existing at the time of the statute's passage. 136 More-
over, they are presumed to have acted with regard to these condi-
tions.' 37 Thus it is reasonable to assume that the legislature knew of
130. See 2A SUTHERLAND'S, supra note 6, § 47.18, at 111.
131. Id.
132. See Doctrine ofEjusdem Generis, sutpra note 123, at 515.
133. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 29 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2 (1971). These provisions reject
the common law notion that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.
In re Captain's Estate, 191 Okla. 463, 464, 130 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1942). Oklahoma courts, how-
ever, have ignored this statutory mandate several times. See, e.g., In re Graves, 481 P.2d 136, 138
(Okla. 1971); Fenton v. Young Chevrolet Co., 191 Okla. 161, 163, 127 P.2d 813, 814 (1942).
134. Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 416 P.2d 917, 926 (Okla. 1966); Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 360 P.2d 826, 830-31 (Okla. 1959); In re Martin's Estate, 183
Okla. 177, 179, 80 P.2d 561, 563 (1938); De Hasque v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 68 Okla. 183, 185-
86, 173 P. 73, 75 (1918). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, §§ 45.14, 48.01-.20.
135. Airview v. Industrial Comm'n, 415 IlL. 522, -, 114 N.E.2d 698, 700 (1953). Home-Stake
Prod. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 416 P.2d 917, 926 (Okla. 1966). Accord, Baggett v. Webb, 46
Ala. App. 666, -, 248 So. 2d 275, 279 (1971); State v. Neal, 187, Neb. 413, -, 191 N.W.2d 458,
460 (1971); Russett School Dist. v. Askew, 193 Okla. 102, 104, 141 P.2d 575, 577 (1943).
136. See, e.g., Gates v. Easter, 354 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1960).
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the inherent title and forfeiture deficiencies of the prior law 38 and that
it passed the statute with these deficiencies in mind.
Under the foreclosure theory, the statute remedies the harsh conse-
quences of forfeiture existing under the prior law. It does not, however,
mitigate any of the problems commonly associated with title to real
estate during the contract term. Consequently, under the foreclosure
theory the statute does not receive a construction which tends to re-
move all of the defects of the prior law.'39 Instead, the more restrictive
interpretation of the foreclosure model tends to perpetuate confusion
concerning the exact nature of the vendor's and vendee's interests
under the contract for deed.' 41 It is this deficiency coupled with the
statutory mandate of liberal construction of legislation that is in dero-
gation of common law14' that requires the foreclosure model to give
way to a theory which remedies all of the inequities of the prior law.
3. Limited Abrogation Theory
The limited abrogation theory is an intermediate construction be-
tween the most liberal interpretation, the complete abrogation ap-
proach, 42 and the most restrictive interpretation, the foreclosure
theory. 143 This theory treats the contract for deed totally as a mortgage
when it is used to finance the sale of real estate and to give the buyer
the immediate right to possession. In the instances where these condi-
tions are not met, the statute is inapplicable and common law concepts
will control. 44
138. See notes 84-97 supra and accompanying text.
139. Oklahoma courts have held that a statute should receive a construction that tends to
remove the defects of the prior law rather than one that perpetuates them. Tinker v. Modern Bhd.
of America, 12 F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1926); Harper v. Victor, 212 F. 903, 906 (8th Cir. 1914);
State exrel. State Bd. of Agriculture v. Warren, 331 P.2d 405,408 (Okla. 1958); Carlile v. National
Oil & Dev. Co., 83 Okla. 217, 231, 201 P. 377, 391 (1921).
140. Under the common law concept of the contract for deed, the seller held legal and equita-
ble title, while the buyer had only a contractual right to purchase the real estate. See notes 33.40
supra and accompanying text. Presumably, under the foreclosure theory, the seller must foreclose
the defaulting buyer's interest in the property. One can only speculate, therefore, on whether the
nature of the buyer's interest is contractual, legal, or equitable.
141. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 119-41 supra and accompanying text.
144. Typically this may occur in the sale of an unimproved parcel of reality purchased for
investment purposes. See Warren, supra note 14, at 615. Many land developers often retain pos-
sessory rights until final payment is made. See Florida Installment Land Contracts, supra note 13,
at 175.
In Graves v. Chambers, 110 Okla. 1, 236 P. 25 (1924), the contract for deed did not provide
the vendee with possession. Id. at 3, 236 P. at 27. Nevertheless the vendee possessed the premises
with the knowledge of the vendor. The Graves court was unwilling to assume that a possessory
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This model is primarily supported by two factors: (1) the title of
the statute and (2) a strikingly similar statute previously enacted in
Florida that has received a judicial construction identical to the limited
abrogation approach. The theory is further buttressed in a negative
way by the weak aspects of the other theories. These considerations,
coupled with the statutory mandate of liberal construction 45 and the
judicial tendency to construe a remedial statute in a way that removes
all of the defects of the prior law, 46 forcibly suggest that the limited
abrogation theory is the most reasonable and sensible interpretation of
legislative intent. 47
When interpreting an ambiguous statute, the title of the act is often
a valuable aid in ascertaining the intent of the legislature. 4 The value
of this interpretive technique is enhanced because of the Oklahoma
constitutional requirement that the subject of every act must be clearly
expressed in its title. 149 Oklahoma courts have construed this constitu-
tional provision to require "that the purpose of an act be clearly ex-
pressed in its title."'15 ° Thus the subject of the act, as expressed in the
title, will define and delimit the scope of the legislation."'
The statutory short title of the new act is "Constructive Mortgage."
The long title states that the statute is "[a]n act. . . providing that con-
interest was part of the parties' agreement when the contract did not provide for it. Id. at 3, 236 P.
at 27. It is unclear whether the new statute would apply in this situation since the contract for
deed did not provide specifically for the right to possession. Equally unclear is the situation where
the contract for deed allows for possession by the vendee, but only after a certain number of
payments have been made. Because the statute is applicable only when the contract for deed is
"made for the purpose of establishing the immediate and continuing right of possession," OKLA.
STAT. tit. 16, § I IA (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added), the situation arguably is governed by common
law rules and not by the statute.
145. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 139 supra.
147. A statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction in order to accomplish
the object and purpose intended by the legislature. AMF Tubescope Co. v. Hatchel, 547 P.2d 374,
379 (Okla. 1976); State ex rel Often v. Mayhue, 476 P.2d 317, 321-22 (1970); Dowell v. Board of
Educ., 185 Okla. 342, 344, 91 P.2d 771, 774 (1939).
148. Irwin v. Irwin, 433 P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1965); State exrel. Bd. of Educ. v. Morley, 168
Okla. 259, 263, 34 P.2d 258, 263 (1934); Taylor v. State, 377 P.2d 508, 510 (Okla. Crim. App.
1962); Brown v. State, 266 P.2d 988, 990 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 6, § 47.03.
149. OKLA. CONsT. art. 5, § 57.
150. Irwin v. Irwin, 433 P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1965) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 177 Okla. 179, 180, 58 P.2d 124, 126 (1936); State ex
rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Morley, 168 Okla. 259, 263, 34 P.2d 258, 263 (1934); State v. Homer, 48 Okla.
Crim. 141, 144, 290 P. 197, 199 (1930).
151. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Prieto, 482 P.2d 919, 924 (Okla. 1971); Oklahoma City v.
Brient, 189 Okla. 163, 165, 114 P.2d 459, 460 (1941).
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tracts for real property shall be treated as mortgages."' 52 It is impor-
tant to note that there is no language in the title which limits the
application of the statute to mortgage foreclosure concepts. This is es-
pecially significant because the purpose of the statute, as gleaned from
the title, will be derived without reference to the text of the act. t53 Thus
it is clear that the title of the act supports the conclusion that the con-
tract for deed is subject to all mortgage concepts and not just to foreclo-
sure rules.15
4
An alternative source of guidance in ascertaining legislative intent
is another state's previously existing statute which is identical in lan-
guage to the statute being construed.' 5 Oklahoma courts have pre-
sumed that a legislative body which adopts verbatim a statute from
another state also adopts the existing judicial construction placed upon
that statute by the highest court of the state from which the statute is
taken.5 6 Even when the statutory language is merely patterned after 57
152. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § I IA (Supp. 1978).
153. Oklahoma courts have stated that the title of an act "must be construed with reference to
the language used in it alone and not in the light of what the body of the act contains." Oklahoma
City v. Prieto, 482 P.2d 919, 924 (Okla. 1971). Accord, Caywood v. Caywood, 541 P.2d 188, 190
(Okla. 1975).
154. The interpretation given to the title will not, however, control the plain, unambiguous
words of the statute. See Territory ex rel. Jones v. Hopkins, 9 Okla. 133, 154, 59 P. 976, 982
(1899); 0. & G. Ry. v. Alexander, 7 Okla. 579, 583, 52 P. 944, 945 (1897), aqifd, 7 Okla. 591, 54 P.
421 (1898). See also Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1965); Algonquin Gas
Transmission Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 162 Conn. 50,-, 291 A.2d 204, 206 (1971); Bankhad
v. McEwan, 387 Mich. 610, -, 198 N.W.2d 414, 415-16 (1972); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 147, -, 397 P.2d 67, 70 (1964). Therefore the statute is only
applicable when the financing factor and the possession element are satisfied. In the absence of
either of these two conditions, traditional law will govern.
155. See Baker v. Knott, 494 P.2d 302, 304 (Okla. 1972). See generally 2A SUTHLERLAND,
supra note 6, § 52.01-.02.
156. Baker v. Knott, 494 P.2d 302, 304 (Okla. 1972); Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 436
P.2d 32, 34 (Okla. 1967); In re Fletcher's Estate, 308 P.2d 304, 311 (Okla. 1957). See also 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 52.02. In Oklahoma it appears that the sister state's prior judicial
construction of the adopted statute is given binding effect. See In re Fletcher's Estate, 308 P.2d
304, 311-12 (Okla. 1957)..Seealso Chesmore v. Chesmore, 484 P.2d 516, 518 (Okla. 1971) (Kansas
decisions are "well-nigh conclusive on the interpretation of early Oklahoma statutes adopted from
the laws of Kansas."); Given v. Owen, 73 Okla. 146, 146-47, 175 P. 345, 346 (1918). Other juris-
dictions do not give the sister state decisions conclusive weight, but merely consider them persua-
sive. See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1972);
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Hoffman v. Schroeder, 38 I11. App.
2d 20, -, 186 N.E.2d, 381, 386 (1962); Cassady v. Wheeler, 224 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1974);
State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Hy-Grade Auto. Court, 546 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Mont. 1976).
Nevertheless, subsequent judicial constructions of the statute by the highest court of the state of
the statute's origin or decisions by intermediate appellate courts of the foreign state are not con-
trolling in Oklahoma. Given v. Owen, 73 Okla. 146, 146-47, 175 P. 345, 346 (1918).
157. Hoffman v. Schroeder, 38 Ill. App. 2d 20, -, 186 N.E. 2d 381, 386 (1962).
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or is similar to 158 the language of the other state's statute, the original
state's existing judicial constructions are still considered persuasive.'59
Oklahoma's contract for deed statute is strikingly similar, but not
identical, to section 697.01 of the Florida Code. The pertinent part of
the Florida provision states:
All conveyances. . . or other instruments of writing convey-
ing or selling property, either real or personal, for the purpose
or with the intention of securing the payment of money...
shall be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to the
same rules offoreclosure and to the same regulations, restraints
andforms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.'60
Although the Oklahoma legislature did not indicate that it derived the
language of the new statute from section 697.01, the substantial similar-
ity of the two statutes is too strong a coincidence to be ignored. In fact,
the coincidence should be persuasive evidence of a legislative adoption
of the Florida statute and of the judicial construction given to it by the
Florida Supreme Court.' 6 '
The scope of the Florida statute, unlike its Oklahoma counterpart,
is not limited to contracts for deed. It applies to any conveyance of real
or personal property which is made for the purpose of securing the pay-
ment of money.' 62 Therefore, in ascertaining the construction given by
the Florida Supreme Court to that part of the Florida statute which is
identical to the Oklahoma provision, an Oklahoma court will not be
restricted to cases involving only contracts for deed. Rather, it may
also consider Florida Supreme Court cases dealing with other forms of
real estate transactions made for the purpose of securing the payment
158. See State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Hy-Grade Auto. Court, 546 P.2d 1050, 1052
(Mont. 1976).
159. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1972)
(great weight given to "comparable legislation"); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 352
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (general rule applied when New Jersey statute was "substantially the same" or
"virtually identical" to Pennsylvania provision). Of course "the strength of the presumption in
favor of the foreign construction varies in relation to the degree of similarity between the foreign
act and the domestic one being construed." 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 52.02, at 329.
Where there has been a change in phraseology from the original act, a presumption arises that the
legislature intended a change in the meaning. Irwin v. Irwin, 433 P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1965).
There are, however, no reported Oklahoma decisions where this presumption has been raised to
help interpret a statute which has been partially adopted from another state.
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.01 (West 1969) (emphasis added). For the text of the similar
Oklahoma provision, OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § I IA (Supp. 1978), see note I supra.
161. See Mann v. State Treasurer, 74 N.H. 345, 68 A. 130 (1907), where the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found a similar coincidence "persuasive evidence of a practical re-enactment...
of the foreign statute." Id. at -, 63 A. at 131.
162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.01 (West 1969). See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
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of money. This latitude in discoverying the interpretation given to the
Florida act is particularly significant because of the paucity of Florida
Supreme Court decisions involving both the statute and the contract for
deed.
Notwithstanding the dearth of contract for deed cases, the Florida
Supreme Court has construed the statute in relation to other types of
real estate transfers which are made for the purpose of securing the
payment of money. In the instances where the supreme court has
found the statute applicable, it has unhesitatingly applied mortgage
concepts. For example, in Elliott v. Connor,163 after determining that a
deed absolute'64 was intended by the parties only to secure the pay-
ment of money, the Florida Supreme Court held that under the statute
the transaction was merely a mortgage and thus only a lien on the gran-
tor's interest.' 65 Moreover the Elliott court suggested that the only ap-
propriate method of terminating the grantor-mortgagor's interest in the
real estate was through foreclosure, but only before the grantor-mort-
gagor had exercised his right to redeem. 66 The holding of Elliott,
along with subsequent decisions,'67 indicates a consistent construction
of the Florida statute. By employing mortgage concepts without excep-
tion, the Florida Supreme Court has clearly evinced an interpretation
which is supportive of the limited abrogation model.
Appellate decisions involving the application of the Florida stat-
ute to the contract for deed have also resulted in an identical construc-
tion of the Florida statute. 68  In Mid-State Investment Corp. v.
163. 63 Fla. 408, 58 So. 241 (1912).
164. See note 115 supra.
165. 63 Fla. at--, 58 So. at 242, 244-245. Florida follows the lien theory of mortgages. FLA,
STAT. ANN. § 697.02 (West 1969). See generaly G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 15.
166. 63 Fla. at -, 58 So. at 242. The Florida court also noted that the grantor-mortgagor also
had the right to possession of the property until foreclosure. Id. at -, 58 So. at 244.
167. See, eg., Four Star Aviation v. United States, 409 F.2d 292, 293 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969) (chat-
tel mortgagor entitled to possession of the chattel until foreclosure); Crawford v. Crawford, 129
Fla. 746, -, 176 So. 838, 840-41 (1937) (purchaser of land at partition sale took title as trustee-
mortgagee and could not prevent co-owner-mortgagors' redemption); Rawlerson ex rel. Rush v.
Green, 124 Fla. 181, -, 167 So. 825, 826-27 (1936) (grantor-mortgagor under deed absolute enti-
tled to possession of the property until foreclosure); Home Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Rivers, 108 Fla.
23, -, 145 So. 873, 876 (1933) (written instrument given to secure the payment of money subject
to foreclosure upon default); Stovall v. Stokes, 94 Fla. 717, -, 115 So. 828, 836-38 (1927) (follow-
ing decision in Elliot v. Connor, 63 Fla. 408, -, 58 So. 241, 242 (1912), held deed given in lieu of
mortgage was a mortgage); Pittman v. Milton 69 Fla. 304, -, 68 So. 658, 663 (1915) (assignee of
life insurance policy held to have a mortgage lien only).
168. The decision in Given v. Owen, 73 Okla. 146, 175 P. 345 (1918), indicates that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court will not consider itself bound by the appellate decisions of the state of
the statute's origin. Id. at 146-47, 175 P. at 346. This is not to say, however, that these appellate
decisions will be totally ignored. Cf. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Ames, 359 Il1. 152, -, 194
[Vol. 14:557
26
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss3/5
CONTRA CT FOR DEED
O'Steen, 169 an appellate court concluded that the Florida statute pre-
vented a vendor from unilaterally repossessing the real estate after the
vendee's default despite a contractual provision to the contrary. 70 Ad-
ditionally it suggested that any attempted conveyance of title by the
vendor to a third party would be legal nullity in the absence of a proper
foreclosure of the vendee's property interest.' 7 ' Likewise in Hoffman v.
Semet 172 the court held that the contract vendee's interest was subject
to levy and execution by his judgment creditors since he held the same
property interest under the statute as a mortgagor under a mortgage. 73
Similar reasoning led the court in Torcise v. Perez174 to conclude that,
because the statute placed the vendor in a position identical to that of a
mortgagee, he had no right to the possession or use of the property sold
to the vendee when the contract was silent on the issue.'75 Undoubt-
edly the combined results of these Florida appellate decisions favor the
conclusion that the contract for deed, when used for securing the pay-
ment of money, is subject to all the rules relating to mortgages, and not
just those relating to mortgage foreclosure.
The distinct similarity of the Florida and Oklahoma statutes,
along with the Florida Supreme Court decisions construing the statute
in relation to other forms of real estate financing, is convincing evi-
dence of how the Oklahoma legislation is to be interpreted. The
Oklahoma act, however, is not identical to the Florida provision. Con-
sequently, Florida's judicial construction of the similar language will
not be controlling in Oklahoma. Yet, due to the apparent legislative
adoption of a major portion of the Florida statute, Florida Supreme
Court decisions should be given persuasive weight when the Oklahoma
courts attempt to ascertain the legislative intent behind the Oklahoma
provision. The Florida appellate court cases dealing specifically with
the contract for deed also support the persuasive nature of the Florida
Supreme Court decisions. Therefore, the Florida construction, com-
bined with the mandate of the Oklahoma statute's title, justifies an in-
terpretation which treats the contract for deed entirely as a mortgage
N.E. 260, 264 (1934) (attorney general's opinion entitled to little weight when it is not shown that
the legislature knew of its existence). See generaly 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 6, § 52.02, at 330.
169. 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
170. Id. at 457. See also H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
171. 133 So. 2d at 458.
172. 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
173. Id. at 652.
174. 319 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
175. Id. at 42.
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when it is used to finance the sale of the property and to give the buyer
the immediate right to possession.
Among the three constructions presented, the limited abrogation
theory is the most reasonable and sensible construction of the
Oklahoma act. This model, unlike the foreclosure model, fosters the
dual statutory purpose of remedying the inequities of forfeiture and of
ameliorating the problems relating to title under the contract for deed.
Further, it does not perpetuate or create confusion about the interests
of the parties under the contract for deed or about the nature of the
defaulting purchaser's interest in the property that is being foreclosed.
The limited abrogation theory, instead, applies mortgage concepts to-
tally when the contract for deed is used to finance the sale and to give
to buyer the immediate right to possession. The remainder of this sec-
tion explains how the model applies to three aspects of the contract for
deed: (1) the interests of the vendor and the vendee; (2) the vendor's
remedies upon default; and (3) the vendee's rights upon default.
a. The Interests of the Vendor and the Vendee
Under the limited abrogation theory, the contract for deed, like its
mortgage counterpart, is merely a lien on the real estate. 176 The vendor
upon execution of the contract for deed is divested of legal title to the
realty and is recognized as a lienor only. 77 The vendee, on the other
hand, holds legal title to the property178 which he can encumber.179
Thus, once the contract for deed is recorded, a conveyance by the seller
176. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
177. Id. This result is analogous to the Oklahoma courts' treatment of the grantee's status
under a deed absolute on its face intended as a mortgage. See note 115 supra. Under this form of
real estate financing, courts have concluded that the creditor-grantee possesses only a mortgage
lien on the property, although he is the record title holder. In re Baxter, 132 Okla. 289, 289-90,
270 P. 565, 566 (1928); Williams v. Purcell, 45 Okla. 489, 504, 145 P. 1151, 1156 (1914). Accord,
Shirey v. All Night & Day Bank, 166 Cal. 50, -, 134 P. 1001, 1003 (1913); Hulsman v. Deal, 90
Kan. 716, -, 136 P. 220, 220 (1913); Pratt v. Pratt, 121 Wash. 298, -, 209 P. 535, 536 (1922).
Contra, Shumate v. McLendon, 120 Fla. 396, -, 48 S.E. 10, 11-12 (1904); Northwestern State
Bank v. Hanks, 122 Neb. 262, -, 240 N.W. 281, 284 (1932). George Osborne submits that if a
jurisdiction, like Oklahoma, follows a lien theory of mortgages, it is preferable to hold that the
creditor-grantee under a deed absolute intended as a mortgage gets only a lien with the debtor-
grantor retaining title. G. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 78, at 116.
Presumably, under the new legislation, the seller continues to be obligated under the contract
for deed to perform by conveying a marketable title of record to the buyer at the time the last
installment is paid. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 58 & 60 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. A judgment lien, likewise, can attach to the
vendee's interest in the property under the contract for deed. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706 (Supp.
1978); White House Lumber Co. v. Howard, 142 Okla. 163, 286 P. 327 (1930) (lien attaches to
judgment debtor's interest in the property). Contra, Stanley v. Velma A. Barnes Real Estate, Inc.,
571 P.2d 871 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). In Stanley, the court of appeals held that under a contract for
[Vol. 14:557
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after the contract's execution transfers no legal title to the third party
purchaser.8 0 Likewise, subsequent lienors through the vendor with
notice of the vendee's interest do not acquire a lien against the prop-
erty.
18 1
b. The Vendor's Remedies Upon Default
When the buyer defaults under the contract for deed, the seller has
three available remedies. First, the vendor may judicially foreclose the
defaulting vendee's interest in the property in order to receive the re-
maining balance of the purchase price. Second, he may accept a deed
from the defaulting purchaser in lieu of the foreclosure action. Third,
under limited circumstances, he may wish to do nothing.
If the seller elects to foreclose the buyer's interest in the prop-
erty,'8 2 there is a public sale of the property. 8 3 This foreclosure sale
has three basic results. First, the net sale proceeds are applied to the
balance due on the contract price.'8 4 Any excess is then used to satisfy
the claims of junior lienors through the vendee, according to their pri-
orities."" Any remaining funds are credited to the vendee's account.' 6
deed the vendee has no equitable title in the realty against which a judgment lien can attach.
Stanley however, is not controlling since the new statute was inapplicable.
180. Accord, Mid-State Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
181. Accord, Hull v. Maryland Cas. Co., 79 So. 2d 519, 520-21 (Fla. 1954).
182. Judicial foreclosure, however, may create some problems for the seller under a contract
for deed that were not present under prior law. Typically, the contract for deed does not meet the
statutory requirements for recordation and, thus, it is not recorded. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 26
(1971) (an instrument affecting real estate must be executed and acknowledged before it will be
recorded); OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 6 (1971). The new legislation states that no foreclosure may be
initiated nor may the court allow this proceeding unless the contract for deed has been recorded
and the mortgage tax paid. See note I supra. The vendor who cannot record his contract for
deed, therefore, may be unable to foreclose the defaulting vendee's interest.
Moreover, because the seller is required to foreclose a defaulting vendee's interest in the land,
he may not have received an adequate amount of the purchase price to defray the costs of a
foreclosure sale in the event of the buyer's premature default. He may also face a loss of revenues
during the pendency of the equitable action, because the buyer remains in possession of the prop-
erty. See note 197 infra and accompanying text. If the foreclosure sale does not bring a purchase
price sufficient to discharge the remaining contract price, the seller may find little comfort having
obtained a deficiency judgment against an individual with virtually no personal assets. See note
73 supra and accompanying text. Finally, a court may refuse to accelerate the balance of the
contract price due upon the buyer's default, absent an acceleration clause in the contract for deed.
Accord, Adkinson v. Nyberg, 344 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
183. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
184. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
186. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. Unlike traditional law, the foreclosure allows
the defaulting vendee to regain all or most of his cash investment in the premises. The vendee
might also recover the fair market value of any improvements and any application in the property
value during the contract term. This assumes, however, that the proceeds of the judicial sale are
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Second, the foreclosure sale terminates the defaulting purchaser's inter-
est in the real estate.187 Finally, the successful bidder at the public auc-
tion acquires title to the property as it existed just prior to the time the
parties entered into the contract for deed. 8'
An alternative to this foreclosure by judicial sale is a deed in lieu
of foreclosure. 89 Under this remedial method, the seller convinces the
adequate to pay the balance of the purchase price and the claims of any junior lienors through the
vendee.
187. See Century Enterprises, Inc. v. Butler, 526 P.2d 1350, 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). This
is analogous to the termination of the mortgagor's equity of redemption in a foreclosure action on
a mortgage. Jelks v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1943); Stephenson v. Clement,
171 Okla. 333, 43 P.2d 430 (1935).
188. See Settles v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 318 P.2d 867 (Okla. 1957); Dusbabek v. Local
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 178 Okla. 592, 63 P.2d 756 (1936). The purchaser at the sale takes title to the
property subject to any outstanding interest holder in the realty not made a party defendant.
These continuing interests may include an encumbrance on the seller's title existing prior to the
execution of the contract for deed foreclosed, see Sherman v. Gens & Barall Inv. Co., 172 Okla.
618, 46 P.2d 491 (1935); Streeter v. Ponca State Bank, 49 Okla. 609, 153 P. 632 (1915), or the
claims of any omitted junior lienors through the vendee. See Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133
(Okla. 1963); State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Loose, 204 Okla. 88, 227 P.2d 402 (1951);
Harding v. Gillett, 25 Okla. 199, 107 P. 665 (1909). See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 17,
§ 328. Along with this conveyance of title, the purchaser receives the right to possession and a
writ of assistance, if necessary. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (1971).
189. See Williams v. Church, 200 Okla. 646, 198 P.2d 995 (1948). Accord, Brinkerhoff v.
Home Trust & Say. Bank, 111 Kan. 1, 204 P. 779 (1921); Brockington v. Lynch, 119 S.C. 273, 12
S.E. 94 (1922). See generally 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 469.1 (P. Rohan rev.
1977 & Supp. 1977). A deed in lieu of foreclosure is a means for terminating the buyer's remain-
ing contractual obligation and any resultant personal liability. See generally 3 R. POWELL, supra,
469.1[11]. Often this will be appealing to a defaulting purchaser who is presented with the pros-
pect of saving a deficiency judgment granted in favor of the seller following the foreclosure sale.
See note 73 supra and accompanying text. A vendee, however, with a substantial investment will
not choose this alternative, because typically the seller will not compensate him for the value of
any payments made, appreciation in the value of the real estate, and improvements made. See
Williams v. Church, 200 Okla. 646, 649, 198 P.2d 995, 997 (1948). Rather, the only consideration
is the seller's promise to forebear from suing the vendee personally on the contract for deed or
foreclosing against the property. Id. See generally 3 R. POWELL, supra, 469.111]. From the
vendor's perspective, a deed in lieu of foreclosure is an inexpensive and expeditious alternative to
a foreclosure action. Instead of initiating a foreclosure proceedings, the seller obtains the vendee's
conveyance and resells the real estate privately to a third party. This is not to say, however, that
there are not some risks to the vendor. First, the seller-grantee takes the property subject to any
interests or encumbrances created between the time of the contract for the deed's execution and
the buyer's subsequent conveyance. See generally 3 R. POWELL, supra, 469.112]. In contrast, if
the seller is the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale, he takes title to the realty free of the
defaulting purchaser's interests and junior lienors through the vendee joined in the foreclosure
action. See note 188 supra and accompanying text. Second, if the consideration paid by the seller
is disproportionately less than the buyer's cash investment or if nothing is paid where the pur-
chaser's interest has some value, the entire conveyance can be construed as unfair and unconscion-
able. See Fisk v. Kundert, 440 P.2d 690, 694 (Okla. 1968); Williams v. Church, 200 Okla. 646, 198
P.2d 995 (1948). In these circumstances, to avoid having the court set aside the conveyance, it is
incumbent on the vendor to demonstrate that the parties' transaction was open and fair and that
the consideration paid was adequate. See Moore v. Beverlin, 186 Okla. 620, 99 P.2d 886 (1939);
Wagg v. Herbert, 19 Okla. 525, 92 P. 250 (1907), aft'd, 215 U.S. 546 (1910). See also Williams v.
Church, 200 Okla. 646, 648-49, 198 P.2d 995, 996-97 (1948).
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defaulting purchaser to cancel the contract for deed, to relinquish his
possession of the realty, and to execute a deed showing record title in
the seller unencumbered by the contract for deed.' 9° In return, the
seller agrees to forebear from suing the purchaser personally for the
remaining purchase price. 191
Finally, when the contract for deed is unrecorded, a seller may
decide to do nothing. 9 a In selecting this option, he relies on two as-
sumptions: (1) the defaulting buyer can be persuaded or threatened
into leaving the property without judicial coercion and (2) the seller's
superior economic and legal position will not be challenged. 93
c. The Vendee's Rights Upon Default
After the default, the purchaser has a statutorily-created right to
redeem the property from the contract for deed by tendering the re-
maining balance of the purchase price at any time prior to foreclo-
sure. 194 Redemption causes the title to the realty to remain in the
vendee free of the vendor's lien.'95 In conjunction with this redemp-
tion, the buyer can compel the seller to execute a deed to evidence rec-
ord title to the property in the buyer.' 96 Additionally, the vendee has
the right to possess the property before his interest is foreclosed. 19
This right exists even though the vendee has defaulted under the terms
of the contract for deed and the contract contains a specific provision
giving the vendor this right upon the vendee's default. 198 The default-
190. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 189, 469.1[1].
191. Id.
192. See Warren, supra note 14, at 633.
193. Id.
194. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
195. See note 76 supra.
196. This result is analogous to the circumstance where the mortgagor, upon full payment of
the debt, exacts a release of the mortgage from the mortgagee to clear up the record title. See G.
OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 294, at 600. If the vendor refuses to execute a deed after a request by
the vendee, he may be subject to statutory penalties. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 15 (1971) (mort-
gages).
197. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. The policy reasons for allowing the vendee to
remain in possession after default are presumably the same as those historically advanced for the
mortgagor's continued possession until foreclosure. First, possession is of little value to the vendor
as a remedy. The substance of his right is realization of the balance due on the purchase price
through foreclosure. Second, possession by the vendee is essential in order for him to have a real
opportunity to redeem. See generally G. OSBORNIE, supra note 17, § 125, at 204. The defaulting
buyer is also entitled to any profits and rents from the property until foreclosure. See note 64
supra. Likewise, the rules governing the appointment of a receiver and the mortgagee-in-posses-
sion relating to mortgages apply equally to contracts for deed. See note 64 supra.
198. See note 64 supra.
1979]
31
Schmidt: The Decline of the Contract for Deed in Oklahoma
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURVAL
ing vendee, therefore, has the dual right of redemption and of posses-
sion prior to foreclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, Oklahoma courts have ignored the substantive similari-
ties between the contract for deed and the mortgage. Instead, the
courts have focused on the contractual nature of the contract for deed.
This treatment of the contract for deed as an executory contract for the
sale of real estate led to the emergence of two defects in the common
law. First, in the event of a default, the nonbreaching seller was per-
mitted to declare an inequitable forfeiture of the buyer's rights and his
investment in the property. Second, because the vendor retained the
title to the property as his security during the contract term, title
problems frequently arose at the time of execution, during the contract
term, and at the time when the seller was obligated to convey title to
the buyer. It is with these deficiencies in mind that the Oklahoma legis-
lature enacted section 11A.
Although the new legislation clearly evinces an intent to make a
change in the existing law and to apply substantive mortgage law to the
contract for deed, the statutory language does not plainly express the
extent to which mortgage concepts will be applied to the contract for
deed. It is this ambiguity in the act's wording that suggests three plau-
sible constructions of the statute. One interpretation provides that he
new legislation completely abrogates the traditional concept of the con-
tract for deed in Oklahoma. A second, more restrictive construction
suggests that the contract for deed is subject to the mortgage rules relat-
ing to foreclosure only. Finally, an intermediate construction between
these two interpretations treats the contract for deed as identical to a
mortgage only when it is used to finance the sale and to give the pur-
chaser the immediate right to possession.
Of the three interpretations, the limited abrogation theory is the
most reasonable and sensible. This theory remedies the deficiencies of
the prior law by ameliorating the harsh consequences of forfeiture for
the defaulting vendee and by mitigating the problems commonly asso-
ciated with the title to the property during the contract term. Further,
the model of limited abrogation takes a more simplistic approach than
the foreclosure theory to the interests of the vendor and the vendee
under the contract for deed by recognizing that the parties to the con-
tract hold interests identical to a mortgagee and mortgagor.
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In view of the Oklahoma legislation, the contract for deed should
become an increasingly unattractive method for financing the sale of
real estate in Oklahoma. This legislation serves the admirable role of
protecting low income purchasers-those persons least able to bear the
harsh results of traditional law. The statute, however, is inapplicable to
individuals who utilize the contract for deed without obtaining the im-
mediate right to possession-typically the investment purchaser. This
implicit exception in the statutory language permits the contract for
deed to continue as a viable financing option in Oklahoma under cir-
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